Addressing allegations, fndings and sanctions concerning corruption in international arbitration

Introduction: confidentiality as a double-edged sword in international arbitration

The confidentiality of arbitral proceedings can, in some cases, shield corrupt conduct from scrutiny, thereby creating the risk that the arbitral process might inadvertently legitimise corrupt acts.^[1] Yet this concern is mitigated by the countervailing principle that confidentiality is not absolute. Disclosure obligations may stem from national legislation, international public policy or soft law instruments.

Furthermore, allegations of corruption are not always made out of genuine concern for the integrity of the arbitral process, they may be raised strategically – usually by the respondent State – to contest otherwise valid claims. The arbitral tribunal may also infer corruption by the presence of red flags. Albeit such indicators do not constitute direct proof, failure to consider them may expose the award to the risk of non-compliance with transnational public policy and render it unenforceable.^[2] This article examines the procedural and substantive effects of corruption allegations that arise during arbitral proceedings.

Proceedings may be used as a 'safe space' by parties involved in illicit conduct to resolve disputes away from scrutiny

Empirical data from ICSID's ISDS and Corruption Dataset reveals that the number of investment arbitration cases involving corruption is growing in parallel with the overall increase in ICSID cases.^[3] This reflects an increasing willingness among parties to invoke corruption as a legal or strategic argument during proceedings.^[4] ICSID cases where corruption has played a pivotal role include World Duty Free v Kenya,^[5] EDF v Romania,^[6] and Metal-Tech v Uzbekistan.^[7]

Corruption encompasses a broad spectrum of misconduct^[8] and, when alleged in arbitral proceedings, is 'notoriously difficult to prove'^[9] due to the concealed nature of corrupt acts.^[10] As a result, arbitral tribunals tend to rely on circumstantial indicators or red flags,^[11] which are fundamental in the evidentiary assessment.^[12] The most commonly cited^[13] are a third party's lack of relevant expertise, the intermediary's proximity to public officials, opaque corporate structures and disproportionate commissions.

On the other hand, party-raised allegations of corruption often involve doctrines such as the 'clean hands' doctrine, or the public policy and illegality exceptions.^[14] However, there is concern that respondent States might raise corruption allegations as a litigation strategy. To address this situation, arbitral tribunals have applied the principle of estoppel^[15] to prevent host States with prior knowledge of the unlawful conduct from invoking the illegality exception as a defence. In any event, tribunals should not consider red flags or corruption allegations in isolation, but rather assess them cumulatively, allowing patterns to emerge from the broader factual matrix.

A uniform approach to the standard of proof that ought to apply has yet to be established.^[16] The presence of serious indicators may shift the burden of proof and justify a closer scrutiny by the tribunal. In certain circumstances, tribunals may investigate ex officio by issuing procedural orders requesting disclosure.^[17]

Allegations of corruption arising during arbitration proceedings

Party-raised allegations post-commencement

The illegality doctrine, the 'clean hands' doctrine and public policy exceptions

Corruption may affect several 'gateway'^[18] questions in investment arbitration. For example, where an investor's entry into the host State was procured by bribery, arbitral tribunals have declined jurisdiction or dismissed claims (see Metal-Tech v Uzbekistan, discussed below). This outcome stems from the legality requirement under investment treaties. Arbitral tribunals have also considered allegations based on the 'clean hands' doctrine. Even though this doctrine is not a general principle of international law,^[19] there are a 'number of cases that had the same practical result'.^[20] Additionally, arbitral tribunals have addressed corruption by invoking general principles of law such as the ex turpi causa^[21] and nemo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans^[22] maxims. In essence, many investment tribunals treat corruption as a gateway issue, the resolution of which can prevent an investor from pursuing an investment-arbitration claim.^[23]

Timing and abuse-of-process risks

Tribunals scrutinise late-raised corruption defences or claims, especially where they were not reported to domestic authorities in a timely manner. In ECE v Czech Republic, the tribunal emphasised the absence of such timely reports and the late stage at which the allegations surfaced; it ultimately found the evidence 'far from reaching a sufficient level of cogency.'^[24] More generally, investment case law shows that there is no general duty on host States to prosecute in domestic courts as a precondition to raising corruption allegations in arbitration; yet tribunals may take State inaction (or, conversely, active domestic proceedings) into account when assessing credibility or potential estoppel/acquiescence arguments.^[25]

Tribunal's own initiative: suspicion of corruption

Duty or discretion to act upon suspicious evidence

Two schools of thought have emerged. One cautions that arbitrators are not roving anti-corruption prosecutors and should not, of their own accord, embark on corruption investigations 'when none is alleged.'^[26] The other argues that, given their role as 'private guardians of international commercial transactions',^[27] arbitrators are not only empowered, but duty-bound to investigate corruption issues to safeguard the integrity and enforceability of awards on public policy grounds.^[28] In practice, however, arbitrators are reluctant to initiate sua sponte enquiries and rarely do so.^[29]

Institutional rules' approach

Institutions equip tribunals with fact-finding powers for dealing with corruption-related issues. For example:

2020 LCIA Rules (Article 22(iv), 22(v)) empower tribunals to order the inspection of any 'documents, goods, samples, property, site or thing under its control' and to compel the production of relevant documents.

ICSID Convention (Article 43(a)) and 2022 ICSID Arbitration Rules (Rule 36(3)) authorise tribunals to call upon parties to produce documents or other evidence.

2021 ICC Rules (Article 25(1)) empower tribunals to establish the facts by all appropriate means.

These frameworks do not give tribunals police powers; however, adverse inferences for non-compliance are available and may be decisive.^[30]

Effects on the procedure

Procedural consequences (admissibility, jurisdiction)

The consequences of corruption vary between commercial and investment arbitration. In commercial arbitration, contracts procured through corruption or for corrupt practices are arbitrable; however, arbitral tribunals do not recognise them as enforceable.^[31] In contrast, in investment arbitration, an investment tainted by illegality typically falls outside the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction ratione materiae and, in such cases, the inquiry is terminated at the preliminary stage.^[32] Where the tribunal's jurisdiction has been established, arbitral tribunals have dismissed claims based on international public policy and as a safeguard of the rule of law, without considering the merits of the claim itself.^[33]

Impact on the award

Awards that disregard serious indicia of illegality, including corruption, may be challenged on public-policy grounds.^[34] For example, in Soleimany v Soleimany the English Court of Appeal held that an arbitration award could not be enforced in England because it was based on an illegal enterprise, i.e. smuggling carpets from Iran to England, which violated Iranian export and revenue laws.^[35] On the other hand, courts will generally uphold an award if the corruption allegation has been properly examined and dismissed by the arbitral tribunal.^[36]

Interaction with domestic criminal investigations

Tribunals must balance a State's sovereign right to enforce criminal law with the need to safeguard the integrity of arbitration proceedings. There is no general principle of international law that requires arbitration proceedings to be suspended when domestic investigations are pending.^[37] However, tribunals may order interim measures to preserve procedural integrity where such criminal investigations appear to disrupt the arbitration. In Quiborax, for example, the tribunal ordered Bolivia to suspend directly related criminal proceedings to protect the claimants' right to present their case.^[38] By contrast, tribunals have declined to intervene where standards of necessity and proportionality have not been met^[39] and, more broadly, when intervention would encroach upon a State's sovereign right and duty to investigate criminal conduct within its own territory.^[40]

Investment arbitration tribunals are not bound by domestic criminal verdicts regarding corruption allegations raised in the arbitration proceedings; however, they may take such verdicts into account, assessing their reliability and procedural regularity.^[41]

Finally, tribunals may factor in a State's failure to prosecute when assessing corruption-based defences raised by that State,^[42] although prosecution is not a pre-condition for invoking corruption in arbitration. Notably, in World Duty Free the tribunal found that the investor had bribed the former president of Kenya, despite the State's failure to prosecute him.^[43]

Evidentiary complexities: proving corruption within arbitration

Burden and standard of proof

The growing prominence of corruption as a global concern has resulted in this contentious issue appearing with increasing frequency in international arbitration proceedings. This heightened attention reflects the international community's concerted efforts to prevent, detect, and sanction corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors, thereby establishing corruption as a critical matter of international public policy.^[44]

However, it is worth noting that, in some cases, the widespread prevalence of corruption has led States to invoke it as a defence in investment treaty disputes, in an attempt to undermine investor claims by arguing that the underlying investment was obtained illegally.^[45] Whether these allegations stem from litigation tactics or a genuine commitment to combatting this type of wrongdoing, they highlight the importance of using robust methods of proof to assess those claims, while maintaining the integrity of the international investment system and pursuing justice.^[46]

This involves analysing the evolving approaches to the burden and standard of proof in corruption cases, moving beyond a simple yes-or-no determination. When examining the most appropriate method of proof, it also considers applying the 'clean hands' doctrine, which has gained traction in international investment arbitration as a defence against claims arising from corrupt investments.^[47] However, as Low mentions, this doctrine must be applied with restraint to prevent governments from opportunistically invoking corruption as a defence to avoid legitimate contractual obligations after having benefited from an investment.^[48] Achieving this delicate balance requires careful scrutiny of the evidentiary record to ensure that tribunals differentiate genuine corruption from political-driven accusations.

Heightened civil standard (balance of probabilities)

The question of the applicable burden and standard of proof in corruption cases remains unresolved. In practice, the threshold often exceeds the typical civil standard of the balance of probabilities, yet falls short of the criminal standard applied in domestic proceedings.^[49] This uncertainty also applies to the methods used to collect evidence and to the complex interaction between arbitral and parallel criminal investigations, both of which make the tribunal's task more difficult.^[50]

Therefore, tribunals often adopt a heightened civil standard known as 'balance of probabilities plus', which requires stronger evidence. This reflects the serious reputational and legal consequences that a finding of corruption entails.^[51]

Due to the difficulty of obtaining direct proof, tribunals often rely on circumstantial evidence and 'red flags' to identify corrupt practices, which in turn requires a flexible and pragmatic approach when evaluating evidence.^[52] This elevated threshold calls for a stronger body of evidence (where there is usually a lack of direct proof),^[53] than that usually required in civil litigation, often depending on a solid collection of circumstantial evidence and logical inferences to prove corrupt practices.^[54]

While not a perfect solution for addressing corruption claims, given the lack of specific regulations on this issue under international arbitration conventions or rules, with only a few cases related to corruption claims being resolved through the international arbitration system, this standard seeks to minimise the risks of frivolous accusations and the unjust dismissals of valid claims, by striking a careful balance between punitive action and the integrity of arbitral proceedings.^[55]

In this context, international arbitral institutions have yet to develop guidelines and toolkits to help arbitrators handle allegations of corruption more effectively.^[56]

Accepted indicia: red flags, circumstantial evidence, adverse inferences

A flexible standard of proof is often used, where red flags, circumstantial evidence, and adverse inferences are accepted indicators of corruption.^[57]

In criminal proceedings where criminal liability is at stake, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. Conversely, in arbitral proceedings, including international arbitration, where criminal liability is not at issue, it is reasonable for a lower standard of proof to be accepted. This enables tribunals to assess and evaluate the collective influence of indirect indicators to determine the truth of the corruption claims. This is especially important because arbitral tribunals typically lack investigative and subpoena powers, which can hinder their ability to collect direct evidence.^[58]

Although not a formal criminal standard, this elevated evidentiary threshold seeks to ensure that findings of corruption – given their serious consequences – are based on sound and reliable evidence.^[59]

Role of parties v tribunal initiative in gathering evidence

As mentioned previously, tribunals do not have the power to gather evidence; therefore, they must rely on the party making the allegation to provide access. This collaborative process often involves distinguishing between broad red flags, which offer limited probative value, and specific indicators that warrant further examination and investigation.^[60] However, tribunals need to be aware that the party making the allegation may use red flags or circumstantial evidence to attempt to convince the tribunal of their claims. In this context, cooperating in the gathering of evidence is not impartial, so the tribunal must undertake this process with caution.

Sanctions lists and regulatory risks

As the fight against corruption challenges governments and international organisations, sanctions lists and regulatory frameworks in anti-corruption and bribery practices are valuable tools for identifying potential corruption. They also serve as databases containing critical information about individuals and entities involved in corruption. Nevertheless, it is essential to recognise that sanctions lists are not always linked to judicial criminal proceedings and are often associated with administrative procedures within regulatory frameworks. Consequently, sanctions lists do not always entail a criminal or judicial procedure involving a high standard of proof.

Recent academic opinion has highlighted the increasing frequency of corruption allegations in investment arbitration, calling for more standardised methods of assessing evidence, particularly when taking into consideration indirect indicators such as sanctions lists.^[61] While sanctions lists and regulatory risks should not be viewed as direct evidence of corruption, aligning anti-corruption compliance practices with arbitral proceedings – particularly through the consistent use of red flags and sanctions lists – is a promising way to improve the credibility and consistency of corruption findings.^[62]

Therefore, strategically incorporating sanctions lists into a standardised assessment of potential corruption offers arbitral tribunals an impartial and verifiable data source, without compromising the parties' procedural independence. This methodology would enable tribunals to assess the validity of corruption allegations more effectively, particularly when there is a lack of direct evidence. Furthermore, such a framework could standardise the evidentiary thresholds for corruption allegations in international arbitration, mitigating the definitional challenges that emerge from the absence of a universally accepted definition of corruption.^[63]

Conclusion

While the principle of confidentiality in arbitration is essential for protecting the parties' interests, it can also create opportunities for concealing corrupt transactions. A key challenge when establishing corruption claims in international arbitration is the absence of direct evidence. In this context, tribunals tend to rely on red flags, circumstantial evidence, adverse inferences and sanctions lists as auxiliary tools. It is essential for arbitral tribunals to ensure that corruption allegations are not used to evade legitimate obligations.
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^[1]  Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP. 'Bribery and Corruption in International Arbitration' (2016, May 11) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=faaa49a6-06e7-46d0-b623-ed3fe5a52477> accessed 4 August 2025.

^[2]  Horvath, G. 'The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award' (2001). 18 Journal of International Arbitration 135; Julian Lew, 'The Law Applicable to the Form and Substance of the Arbitration'.

^[3]  ICSID, 'The ICSID Caseload – Statistics' (2025) <https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/2025-«1%20ENG%20-%20The%20ICSID%20Caseload%20Statistics%20%28Issue%202025-1%29.pdf> accessed 5 August 2025.

^[4]  In recent years, parties have increasingly raised allegations of corruption either as the foundation for their claims or as jurisdictional defences to challenge the admissibility or validity of investment claims. In 67% of the cases analysed, respondent States advanced the allegations, while investors did so in 28% of the cases. Kryvoi, Y., & Godhe, A. 'Enhancing anti-corruption via investment arbitration. From red flags to due diligence' (2024). Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 16, 1-21 <https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idae020> accessed 1 August 2025.

^[5]  World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No ARB/00/7. Award (4 October 2006). <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw15005.pdf> accessed 29 October 2025. The tribunal refused to uphold a contract procured through bribery, emphasising that international public policy prohibits the enforcement of claims tainted by corruption. This decision underscores the principle that contracts tainted by corruption cannot be upheld, even if the corrupt act was acceptable within the host State's legal or political context.

^[6]  EDF (Services) Limited v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/13. Award (8 October 2009) <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0267.pdf> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[7]  Metal-Tech Ltd. v Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No ARB/10/3. Award (4 October 2013) <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf> accessed 29 October 2025. The tribunal found sufficient evidence of corruption and consequently declined jurisdiction over the investor's claim.

^[8]  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. United Nations Convention Against Corruption. (2004). <https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf> accessed 1 August 2025.

    These include bribery of national public officials (Art 15), embezzlement of public sector property (Art 17), trading in influence (Art 18), the abuse of functions (Art 19), illicit enrichment (Art 20), money laundering (Art 23) and concealment (Art 24).

^[9]  See para [221] EDF (Services) Limited v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/13, Award (8 October 2009): 'In any case, however, corruption must be proven and is notoriously difficult to prove since, typically, there is little or no physical evidence'.

^[10] As commentators put it: '[c]orruption, by its very nature, occurs in obscure and hidden circumstances and leaves no or scant traces behind,' since '[b]ribe-givers and bribe-takers all use schemes to disguise their transactions.' Menaker, A., Greenwald, B. 'Proving Corruption in International Arbitration: Who Has the Burden and How Can it Be Met?' (2015). Dossier of the ICC Institute of World Business Law: Addressing Issues of Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration.

                See also Carlevaris, A., 'Foreword ICC Bulletin (Supplement)' 24 (2013). 'By its very nature, it is notoriously difficult to combat, yet its eradication is essential to healthy trading relations'.

^[11] Some of the most widely applied lists include the following:

- ICC, 'ICC Commission Document on Red Flags or Other Indicators of Corruption in International Arbitration' (Offprint from ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin I Issue 2024-2) <https://iccwbo.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2024/12/2024-ICC-Red-Flags-or-Other-Indicators-of-Corruption_ICC-DRS-Bulletin.pdf> accessed 6 August 2025;

- ICC Commission. 'ICC Guidelines on Agents, Intermediaries and Other Third Parties'. (2010) <https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/parties_publications/C3765/Respondent%27s%20Counter-Memorial/Pi%C3%A8ces%20juridiques/RL-0051.pdf>, accessed 6 August 2025;

- Basel Institute on Governance, 'Corruption and Money Laundering in International Arbitration, “A Toolkit for Arbitrators"' (2019). <https://baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/a_toolkit_for_arbitrators_29_05_2019_single_pages.pdf>, accessed 6 August 2025.

- Specifically, in the context of public procurement, Preventing Corruption in Public Procurement (OECD 2016) and Warning Signs of Fraud and Corruption in Procurement (World Bank 2019).

- In relation to third-party bribing, Good Practice Guidelines on Conducting Third-Party Due Diligence (Partnering Against Corruption Initiative, World Economic Forum 2013).

^[12] The concept of 'red flags' in the context of corruption originated in the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. ICC 'ICC Commission Document on Red Flags or Other Indicators of Corruption in International Arbitration' (Offprint from ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin I Issue 2024-2) <https://iccwbo.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2024/12/2024-ICC-Red-Flags-or-Other-Indicators-of-Corruption_ICC-DRS-Bulletin.pdf> accessed 6 August 2025, p 40.

                Low, L.A. 'Dealing with Allegations of Corruption in International Arbitration' (2019). 113 AJIL Unbound, cited in Kryvoi, Y., & Godhe, A. 'Enhancing anti-corruption via investment arbitration: From red flags to due diligence' (2024). Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 16, 1-21 <https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idae020> accessed 1 August 2025.

^[13] See Metal-Tech Ltd. v Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No ARB/10/3 at [293], by reference to Woolf Committee Report on Business Ethics, Global Companies and the Defence Industry: Ethical Business Conduct in Bae Systems Plc 25-26 (2008).

                Unusual contract terms or payment arrangements—such as cash payments, payments to unrelated accounts or in foreign currencies, or payments routed through unrelated countries—further heighten suspicion.

^[14] De Navacelle, S., Garnier, S., Duran-Hernandez, D. 'Addressing corruption allegations in international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration' (2022). <https://www.ibanet.org/addressing-corruption-in-international-commercial-arbitration-and-investment-arbitration#_ednref19> accessed 28 August 2025, paras 11–16.

^[15] See para 346 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v The Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No Arb/03/25, Award (6 August 2007): 'There is, however, the question of estoppel. Principles of fairness should require a tribunal to hold a government estopped from raising violations of its own law as a jurisdictional defense when it knowingly overlooked them and endorsed an investment which was not in compliance with its law'. <https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/decision/en-fraport-ag-frankfurt-airport-services-worldwide-v-republic-of-the-philippines-i-award-thursday-16th-august-2007> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[16] Menaker, A., Greenwald, B. 'Proving Corruption in International Arbitration: Who Has the Burden and How Can it Be Met?' (2015). Dossier of the ICC Institute of World Business Law: Addressing Issues of Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration. See discussion in section 4, both in relation to international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration.

^[17] In Metal Tech, for instance, the tribunal issued a series of procedural orders requesting the disclosure of all consulting agreements, payment schedules, amounts paid and recipients. See paras 246 and 248-252 of Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No ARB/10/3.

^[18] In reference to issues of arbitrability, jurisdiction and admissibility as characterised by Y. Banifatemi, 'Chapter 1: The Impact of Corruption on “Gateway Issues" of Arbitrability, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Procedural Issues', in Domitille Baizeau and Richard Kreindler (eds), Addressing Issues of Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 13 (Kluwer Law International; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 2015) pp. 16–31.

^[19] Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 226, Final Award, (18 July 2014), paras 1362–63; see also, Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd. v Bangladesh & Ors, ICSID Case No ARB/10/11 and ARB/10/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (19 August 2013), para. 477.

^[20] 'International Arbitration', in Domitille Baizeau and Richard Kreindler (eds), ICC Dossier No. 13: Addressing Issues of Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 13 (Kluwer Law International; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 2015), p. 39.

^[21] World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No ARB/00/7. Award (4 October 2006).

^[22] Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26. Award (2 August 2006).

^[23] 'International Arbitration', in Domitille Baizeau and Richard Kreindler (eds), ICC Dossier No. 13: Addressing Issues of Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 13 (Kluwer Law International; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 2015), p. 45.

^[24] ECE Projektmanagement v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2010-5, Award (19 September 2013), para. 4.931.

^[25] Marie Stoyanov, Werner Eyskens, et al., 'Procedural interplay between investment arbitration and criminal proceedings in the context of corruption allegations', in Annet van Hooft and Jean-François Tossens (eds), b-Arbitra | Belgian Review of Arbitration, Volume 2018 Issue 1 (Wolters Kluwer 2018) pp. 12–17.

^[26] '2. Agreement to Arbitrate', in Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Seventh Edition) <https://www.kluwerarbitration.com/document/kli-ka-blackaby-2022-ch02> accessed on 29 October 2025, para 2.158.

^[27] Julian Lew, 'Determination of Arbitrator's Jurisdiction and the Public Policy Limitations on that Jurisdiction' (n. 255), p. 85.

^[28] 'Chapter 5: An Obligation or Discretionary Power to Sua Sponte Investigate?', in Emmanuel O. Igbokwe, Dealing with Bribery and Corruption in International Commercial Arbitration: To Probe or Not to Probe International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 65, pp. 195–250. See also, Martim Della Valle and Pedro Schilling De Carvalho, 'Corruption Allegations In Arbitration: Burden and Standard of Proof, Red Flags, and a Proposal for Systematisation', in Maxi Scherer (ed), Journal of International Arbitration, Volume 39 Issue 6 (Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2022) p. 827.

^[29] 'Chapter 5: An Obligation or Discretionary Power to Sua Sponte Investigate?', in Emmanuel O. Igbokwe, Dealing with Bribery and Corruption in International Commercial Arbitration: To Probe or Not to Probe International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 65, paras 458–464.

^[30] Uluc, Inan, 'Corruption in International Arbitration' (2016). SJD Dissertations, p. 202. For example, in Metal-Tech v Uzbekistan, an ICSID tribunal ordered the production of consulting agreements and evidence of services/payments. The claimant's failure to provide evidence of genuine services, combined with 'red flags', such as high fees, the consultants' lack of qualifications and complex payment schemes, led the tribunal to find that bribery had tainted the investment and to decline jurisdiction under the treaty's legality requirement.

^[31] Y. Banifatemi, 'Chapter 1: The Impact of Corruption on “Gateway Issues" of Arbitrability, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Procedural Issues', in Domitille Baizeau and Richard Kreindler (eds), Addressing Issues of Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 13 (Kluwer Law International; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 2015) paras 13, 32–35.

^[32] Phoenix v Czech Republic; SAUR v Argentina; Inceysa v El Salvador; cited Y. Banifatemi, 'Chapter 1: The Impact of Corruption on “Gateway Issues" of Arbitrability, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Procedural Issues', in Domitille Baizeau and Richard Kreindler (eds), Addressing Issues of Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 13 (Kluwer Law International; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 2015) para 43.

^[33] Plama v Bulgaria; Metal-Tech v Uzbekistan; Inceysa v El Salvador; cited in Y. Banifatemi, 'Chapter 1: The Impact of Corruption on “Gateway Issues" of Arbitrability, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Procedural Issues', in Domitille Baizeau and Richard Kreindler (eds), Addressing Issues of Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 13 (Kluwer Law International; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 2015) paras 46–48.

^[34] See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its 18th Session (3–21 June 1985): 'it was understood that the term “public policy" which was used in the 1958 New York Convention and many other treaties, covered fundamental principles of law and justice in substantive as well as procedural respects. Thus, instances such as corruption, bribery or fraud and similar serious cases would constitute a ground for setting aside'.

^[35] Soleimany v Soleimany [1999] Q.B. 785 (C.A.), cited in Born, International Commercial Arbitration.

^[36] For example, in Westacre v Jugoimport the English Court of Appeal held that, even if the underlying contract was to pay bribes to Kuwaiti government officials, the arbitral award would still be enforced if the parties had an opportunity of putting the corruption allegations before the arbitral tribunal.

..  See Westacre Investments Inc. v Jugoimport SDPR Holding Co. Ltd and Others [2000] QB 288 (C.A.); <https://7kbw.co.uk/westacre-investments-inc-v-jugoimport-sdpr-holding-company-ltd-and-others/> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[37] M. Stoyanov, Procedural Interplay between Investment Arbitration and Criminal Proceedings, p. 19. 

^[38] Quiborax v Bolivia; and Lao Holdings N.V. v Lao People's Democratic Republic; cited in Marie Stoyanov, Werner Eyskens, et al., 'Procedural interplay between investment arbitration and criminal proceedings in the context of corruption allegations', in Annet van Hooft and Jean-François Tossens (eds), Volume 2018 Issue 1 (Wolters Kluwer 2018) pp. 7-40

^[39] M. Munshi v The State of Mongolia, SCC Case EA 2018/007, Award on Emergency Measures (5 February 2018), paras 47, 48.

^[40] Italba Corporation v Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No ARB/16/9, Decision on Claimant's Application for Provisional Measures and Temporary Relief (15 February 2017), paras 115, 116.

^[41] Niko Resources v Bangladesh; MOL v Croatia; cited in Marie Stoyanov, Werner Eyskens, et al., 'Procedural interplay between investment arbitration and criminal proceedings in the context of corruption allegations', in Annet van Hooft and Jean-François Tossens (eds), Volume 2018 Issue 1 (Wolters Kluwer 2018) paras 45-49.

^[42] See Wena Hotels Ltd. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Award (8 December 2000), para 116.

^[43] World Duty Free Company v Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (4 October 2006), para 180.

^[44] Low, L. A. 'Dealing with Allegations of Corruption in International Arbitration' AJIL Unbound (2019), 113, 341. <https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.61> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[45] Kaban, M. 'Application of The Burden and Standard of Proof in Corruption Allegations Under ICSID Arbitration', Public and Private International Law Bulletin. (2022).  <https://doi.org/10.26650/ppil.2022.42.1.889190> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[46] Gaillard, E. 'The emergence of transnational responses to corruption in international arbitration'. Arbitration International (2019), 35(1), 1 <https://doi.org/10.1093/ar bint/aiz004> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[47] Chaisse, J.. Tackling Corruption in Foreign Investment: Insights from Investment Arbitration Cases. The Law and Development Review (2023), 16(2), 253. <https://doi.org/10.1515/ldr-2023-0055> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[48] Low, L. A. 'Dealing with Allegations of Corruption in International Arbitration' AJIL Unbound (2019), 113, 341. <https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.61> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[49] Hwang, M., & Lim, K. 'Corruption in Arbitration Law and Reality', Asian International Arbitration Journal (2012), 8(1), 1. <https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/hsmith_lect/1/> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[50] Horvath, G. J., & Khan, K. (2017). Addressing Corruption in Commercial Arbitration: How Do Arbitral Tribunals Evaluate and

Adjudicate Contractual Relationships Tainted by Corruption?; Giupponi, B. O., & Yu, H.-L. (2022). Analysing Obstacles and

Challenges in Fighting Corruption in Cases of Illegal Investments. Laws, 11(4), 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws11040059

^[51] Marcenaro, E. 'Arbitrators' Investigative and Reporting Rights and Duties on Corruption' (2015).

^[52] Della Valle, M., & Schilling De Carvalho, P. 'Corruption Allegations In Arbitration: Burden and Standard of Proof, Red Flags, and a Proposal for Systematisation' (2022).

^[53] Hwang, M., & Lim, K. 'Corruption in Arbitration Law and Reality', Asian International Arbitration Journal (2012), 8(1), 1. <https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/hsmith_lect/1/> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[54] Low, L. A. 'Dealing with Allegations of Corruption in International Arbitration' AJIL Unbound (2019), 113, 341. <https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.61> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[55] Khvalei, V. 'Standards Of Proof For Allegations Of Corruption In International Arbitration' (n.d.).

^[56] Wilske, S. 'International Arbitration and Its Dark Sides, in Particular Corruption: What Arbitral Institutions Could and Should Do to Tackle Such Unwelcome Issues'. SSRN Electronic Journal (2019) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3498155> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[57] Hwang, M., & Lim, K. 'Corruption in Arbitration Law and Reality', Asian International Arbitration Journal (2012), 8(1), 1. <https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/hsmith_lect/1/> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[58] Hwang, M., & Lim, K. 'Corruption in Arbitration Law and Reality', Asian International Arbitration Journal (2012), 8(1), 1. <https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/hsmith_lect/1/> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[59] Partasides, C. 'Proving Corruption in International Arbitration: A Balanced Standard for the Real World'. ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal (2010), 25(1), 47. <https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/25.1.47> accessed 29 October 2025; The Metal-Tech v Republic of Uzbekistan case demonstrates how a tribunal's proactive inference of corruption, based on strong circumstantial evidence, could ultimately result in a declination of jurisdiction.

^[60] Low, L. A. 'Dealing with Allegations of Corruption in International Arbitration' AJIL Unbound (2019), 113, 341. <https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.61> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[61] Campos, A. A. C. 'Corrupción en arbitraje internacional de inversiones: ¿es un peligro o un salvavidas para países en desarrollo?' THEMIS Revista de Derecho (2020), 77, 457. <https://doi.org/10.18800/themis.202001.025> accessed 29 October 2025.

^[62] Martim Della Valle and Pedro Schilling De Carvalho, 'Corruption Allegations In Arbitration: Burden and Standard of Proof, Red Flags, and a Proposal for Systematisation', in Maxi Scherer (ed), Journal of International Arbitration, Volume 39 Issue 6 (Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2022).

^[63] Low, L. A. 'Dealing with Allegations of Corruption in International Arbitration' AJIL Unbound (2019), 113, 341. <https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.61> accessed 29 October 2025.

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